Research note — Pillai v. Menon

Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy v. Baddam Pratapa Reddy (Dead) Thr Lrs. & Anr.

[2019] 11 S.C.R. 739 · SC · 3-judge · good_law

A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court (NV Ramana, Shantanagoudar, Ajay Rastogi JJ) held that readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) SRA, read with Article 54 of the Limitation Act, is satisfied where the plaintiff has specifically averred in the plaint that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, has been demanding that the defendant receive the balance consideration and execute the sale deed, and the court is satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff had sufficient money to pay the balance. The court held that 'there cannot be any proof of oral demand' and that the plaintiff's conduct and financial capacity are the relevant tests. This directly supports Mr. Pillai's position: he paid 90.5% upfront, sent three written demands, and tendered the balance by demand draft upon the defendant's cancellation notice.

¶17 (reasoning)

Moreover, the High Court has wrongly observed that the plaintiff has not produced any evidence to prove that he demanded the performance of sale after the execution of the agreement of sale. The filing of a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale is governed by Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, read with Article 54 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963. In addition to this, Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 prescribe the format of the plaint for such a suit. Thus, a plaint which seeks the relief of specific performance of an agreement/contract must comply with all these requirements. In the matter at hand, the plaintiff has specifically averred in his plaint that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract under the agreement of sale dated 20.04.1993. It was also specifically stated that the plaintiff had been demanding that the first defendant receive the balance consideration of Rs. 58,800/- and execute a regular registered sale deed at his cost, but the first defendant had been avoiding the specific performance of the agreement of sale. In light of this, in our considered opinion, all the formalities which are to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff for getting a decree of specific performance have been fulfilled. Moreover, there A B C D E F G H 751 cannot be any proof of oral demand. Be that as it may, we are satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff had sufficient money to pay the balance consideration to the first defendant and was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

Relevance: A three-judge bench held that readiness and willingness is established where the plaint avers it, the plaintiff has been demanding execution, and the court is satisfied the plaintiff had sufficient money to pay the balance — directly applicable to Mr. Pillai who paid 90.5% upfront, sent three written demands, and tendered the balance by demand draft.

Smt. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Anr. v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

[2022] 17 S.C.R. 416 · SC · 3-judge · good_law

A three-judge bench (NV Ramana CJI, Krishna Murari J, Hima Kohli J) authoritatively held that the 2018 amendment to Section 10 SRA converted specific performance from a discretionary to a mandatory remedy. The court also held that the 2018 amendment was substantive and prospective. Since Mr. Pillai's agreement is dated 15.03.2020 (post-amendment), the mandatory regime applies directly. The court also confirmed the two-part structure of Article 54.

¶68 (ratio)

This provision, which remained in the realm of the Courts’ discretion, was converted into a mandatory provision, prescribing a power the Courts had to exercise when the ingredients were fulfilled. This was a significant step in the growth of commercial law as the sanctity of contracts was reinforced with parties having to comply with contracts and thereby reducing efficient breaches.

Relevance: The three-judge bench authoritatively held that the 2018 amendment to Section 10 SRA converted specific performance from discretionary to mandatory — directly applicable to Mr. Pillai's agreement dated 15.03.2020, which post-dates the amendment.

¶66 (ratio)

In any case, the amendment carried out in 2018 was enacted to further bolster adherence to the sanctity of contracts. This approach was radical and created new rights and obligations which did not exist prior to such an amendment. Section 10, after amendment, reads as under:

Relevance: The court characterised the 2018 amendment as 'radical' and creating 'new rights and obligations' — supporting the argument that the defendant cannot rely on pre-amendment discretionary principles to resist the decree.

Muslimveetil Chalakkal Ahammed Haji v. Sakeena Beevi

[2026] 1 S.C.R. 395 · SC · 2-judge · good_law

A very recent (January 2026) Supreme Court decision in a Kerala-specific specific performance suit, holding that limitation under Article 54 commences from the date of the defendant's final refusal to execute the sale deed, not from the contractual date, and that readiness and willingness was wrongly decided against the plaintiff where the evidence established the plaintiff's consistent pursuit of the transaction. Directly on point for Mr. Pillai: the defendant's final refusal was by notice dated 14.06.2023, and the suit filed on 15.07.2024 is within three years of that date.

¶35 (reasoning)

The most crucial and vital document, which, in our considered view, tilts the balance in favour of the plaintiff-appellant, is the affidavit (Exh. A5) executed by the defendant on 30th April, 2013. The execution of the said affidavit (Exh. A5) was neither disputed nor denied by the defendant–respondent, who admittedly did not enter the witness box in the suit proceedings. Instead, her son Shri Rasheeq Ahmed alone was examined as DW-1. A plain reading of the affidavit, particularly the highlighted portions (supra) thereof, clearly establish that the defendant–respondent not only ratified the acts performed by the power of attorney holder, her brother Shri Muhammed Rafi Thangal, but also expressly conveyed her no-objection to the change in management and so also the ownership of the school and the properties appurtenant thereto in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. Once the two facts, i.e., the publication of notice in the year 2012 for revocation of the unregistered power of attorney (Exh. A4) and the affidavit dated 30th April, 2013 are cumulatively taken into account, manifestly, limitation would start running from the later date because 406 [2026] 1 Supreme Court Reports it is, at that stage, that the respondent-defendant finally refused execution of sale deed to the extent of her share in the suit property.

Relevance: The court held that limitation runs from the date of the defendant's final refusal to execute the sale deed — directly applicable to Mr. Pillai's case where the defendant's final refusal was by notice dated 14.06.2023, making the suit filed on 15.07.2024 within three years.

¶36 (ratio)

In this backdrop, we are of the firm view that the issue of limitation was erroneously decided by the trial Court as well as the High Court, leading to an unjustified rejection of the suit instituted by the appellant.

Relevance: The court held that the limitation issue was erroneously decided against the plaintiff where the defendant's final refusal was the relevant starting point — supports Mr. Pillai's argument that limitation runs from 14.06.2023 (date of defendant's cancellation notice), not 14.03.2021.

C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy (D) by LRs. & Ors.

(2020) 2 S.C.R. 676 · SC · 2-judge · good_law

This case authoritatively states the N.P. Thirugnanam principle on continuous readiness and willingness: the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances, and may infer readiness and willingness from facts and circumstances. Para 15 holds that 'the amount which he has to pay the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available' — a standard Mr. Pillai satisfies by actual payment of 90.5% and tender of the balance by demand draft.

¶15 (ratio)

The words ‘ready and willing’ imply that the plaintiff was prepared to carry out those parts of the contract to their logical end so far as they depend upon his performance. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing C.S. VENKATESH v. A.S.C. MURTHY (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.] to perform his part of contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount which he has to pay the defendant must be of necessity to be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution of the contract till the date of decree, he must prove that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready to perform his contract.

Relevance: The court held that readiness and willingness may be inferred from facts and circumstances, and that the court must consider the plaintiff's conduct prior and subsequent to filing — Mr. Pillai's upfront payment of 90.5%, three written demands, and tender of balance by demand draft satisfy this standard.

¶16 (reasoning)

In N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) by LRs. v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and Others1, it was held that continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant of the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff pri or to and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must necessarily be proved to be available.

Relevance: This paragraph quotes the N.P. Thirugnanam principle — the standard requires consideration of the plaintiff's conduct and proof that the consideration amount was available; Mr. Pillai satisfies both by upfront payment of 90.5% and tender of the balance by demand draft.

Giriyappa & Anr. v. Kamalamma & Ors.

[2024] 12 S.C.R. 2095 · SC · 2-judge · good_law

A recent Supreme Court decision (December 2024) setting out the prerequisites for protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — the fallback argument for Mr. Pillai's possession and injunction claim. All three conditions are satisfied in Mr. Pillai's case: registered agreement (Document No. 451/2020), possession delivered on 07.04.2020 and held continuously, and willingness to perform evidenced by three demand letters and tender of balance.

¶11 (ratio)

From the aforesaid, it is evident that the protection of a prospective purchaser/transferee of his possession of the property involved, is available subject to the following prerequisites: (a) There is a contract in writing by the transferor for transfer for consideration of any immovable property signed by him or on his behalf, from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty; (b) The transferee has, in part-performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part- performance of the contract; (c) The transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract and has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.

Relevance: The three prerequisites for Section 53A protection are all satisfied in Mr. Pillai's case: registered agreement (Document No. 451/2020), possession delivered on 07.04.2020 and held continuously, and willingness to perform evidenced by three demand letters and tender of balance — supporting the injunction claim and the fallback possession argument.

C. Haridasan v. Anappath Parakkattu Vasudeva Kurup & Others

(2023) 3 S.C.R. 244 · SC · 2-judge · good_law

A Kerala-specific Supreme Court decision (2023) restoring a trial court decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell where the trial court had found the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and had paid part sale consideration. Directly on point for Mr. Pillai's suit before the Munsiff Court, Ernakulam.

¶49 (reasoning)

6. It is contended on behalf of the defendants that the agreement to sell was a forced agreement to sell. On the contrary, the defendants stated in the written statement in para 4 that the defendants were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. It may be true that at the relevant time the defendants may be in need of money. However, the fact remains that they agreed to sell the property in question A B C D E F G H 257 for sale consideration mentioned in the agreement to sell and as observed hereinabove, it was the case on behalf of the defendants that they were always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. Therefore, as observed hereinabove, it was never the case on behalf of the defendants in the written statement and/or even before the learned trial Court that the agreement to sell was inequitable and/or was a forced agreement to sell. Even the learned trial Court also did not frame the issue, “whether agreement to sell was a forced agreement to sell/contract or not”. On appreciation of entire evidence on record, the learned trial Court after recording the findings on the execution of the agreement to sell by the defendants and receipt of part sale consideration and that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, decreed the suit for specific performance. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, as such, has not commented upon and/or set aside any of the findings recorded by the learned trial Court, recorded while passing a decree for specific performance. Straightway, the High Court has considered Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act and has observed and held that by enhancing the amount of sale consideration, the learned trial Court has wrongly exercised the discretion in favour of the plaintiff. The High Court has commented upon the order passed by the learned trial Court enhancing the amount of sale consideration and directing the plaintiff to pay some more amount than the sale consideration mentioned in the agreement to sell.

Relevance: The Supreme Court restored the trial court's decree for specific performance where the trial court had found the plaintiff was always ready and willing and had paid part consideration — directly applicable to Mr. Pillai's suit before the Munsiff Court, Ernakulam, where the same findings are available on the evidence.