# Research note — Pillai v. Menon

> **Sample · fictional matter · for demonstration.** Generated by CaseLayer from the live agent pipeline. 16 iterations / ~6 minutes / trace `37226a74…`.

**Confidence:** medium

## Framed issues
- Whether Mr. Rajan Pillai has satisfied the requirement of continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract within the meaning of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, given that he paid 90.5% of the sale consideration (Rs. 95,00,000/-) on the date of the agreement (15.03.2020), took possession on 07.04.2020, sent three formal written demands (11.06.2021, 23.09.2021, 18.02.2022), and tendered the balance Rs. 10,00,000/- by demand draft on 27.06.2023 upon the defendant's cancellation notice — notwithstanding the absence of a formal tender within the contractual period ending 14.03.2021.
  - Whether readiness and willingness may be inferred from the totality of conduct — including upfront payment of 90.5% of consideration, delivery of possession, and repeated written demands — without a formal tender of the balance within the contractual period.
  - Whether the defendant's complete silence for over three years in response to three demand letters, followed by a belated cancellation notice, negates any 'time is of the essence' argument and shifts the default to the defendant.
  - Whether the adverse authorities Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi (2011) 12 SCC 18 and N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao are distinguishable on the facts of Mr. Pillai's case.
- Whether, under the amended Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (w.e.f. 01.10.2018), specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 15.03.2020 is the general rule and the court's discretion to refuse it is substantially curtailed, and whether the defendant's conduct (receiving 90.5% of consideration, delivering possession, and remaining silent for over three years before purporting to cancel on 14.06.2023) disentitles her from resisting the decree.
  - Whether the 2018 amendment to Section 10 SRA converted specific performance from a discretionary to a mandatory remedy, subject only to the exceptions in Sections 11(2), 14, and 16.
  - Whether the 2018 amendment applies to agreements executed after 01.10.2018 (the agreement here is dated 15.03.2020).
- Whether the suit O.S. No. 247 of 2024 filed on 15.07.2024 is barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where the agreement stipulated performance on or before 14.03.2021 but the defendant explicitly repudiated the agreement only by notice dated 14.06.2023, and whether the suit filed within three years of that repudiation is within time.
  - Whether the first part of Article 54 (limitation from 'date fixed for performance') or the second part ('when plaintiff has notice that performance is refused') governs, given the defendant's three-year silence after 14.03.2021 and explicit repudiation only on 14.06.2023.
  - Whether the defendant's silence in response to three demand letters (2021–2022) and her failure to invoke any forfeiture clause or rescind the agreement within the contractual period amounts to waiver of the time stipulation, making the second part of Article 54 applicable.

## Leading authorities
### Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy v. Baddam Pratapa Reddy (Dead) Thr Lrs. & Anr.
`[2019] 11 S.C.R. 739` · SC · 3-judge · **good_law**

A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court (NV Ramana, Shantanagoudar, Ajay Rastogi JJ) held that readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) SRA, read with Article 54 of the Limitation Act, is satisfied where the plaintiff has specifically averred in the plaint that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, has been demanding that the defendant receive the balance consideration and execute the sale deed, and the court is satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff had sufficient money to pay the balance. The court held that 'there cannot be any proof of oral demand' and that the plaintiff's conduct and financial capacity are the relevant tests. This directly supports Mr. Pillai's position: he paid 90.5% upfront, sent three written demands, and tendered the balance by demand draft upon the defendant's cancellation notice.

> **¶17 (reasoning)** — Moreover, the High Court has wrongly observed that the
plaintiff has not produced any evidence to prove that he demanded the
performance of sale after the execution of the agreement of sale. The
filing of a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale is
governed by Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, read with
Article 54 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963. In addition to this,
Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
prescribe the format of the plaint for such a suit. Thus, a plaint which
seeks the relief of specific performance of an agreement/contract must
comply with all these requirements. In the matter at hand, the plaintiff
has specifically averred in his plaint that he was ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract under the agreement of sale dated
20.04.1993. It was also specifically stated that the plaintiff had been
demanding that the first defendant receive the balance consideration of
Rs. 58,800/- and execute a regular registered sale deed at his cost, but
the first defendant had been avoiding the specific performance of the
agreement of sale. In light of this, in our considered opinion, all the
formalities which are to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff for getting
a decree of specific performance have been fulfilled. Moreover, there

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751
cannot be any proof of oral demand. Be that as it may, we are satisfied
from the evidence that the plaintiff had sufficient money to pay the
balance consideration to the first defendant and was ready and willing
to perform his part of the contract.
>
> *Relevance:* A three-judge bench held that readiness and willingness is established where the plaint avers it, the plaintiff has been demanding execution, and the court is satisfied the plaintiff had sufficient money to pay the balance — directly applicable to Mr. Pillai who paid 90.5% upfront, sent three written demands, and tendered the balance by demand draft.


### Smt. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Anr. v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
`[2022] 17 S.C.R. 416` · SC · 3-judge · **good_law**

A three-judge bench (NV Ramana CJI, Krishna Murari J, Hima Kohli J) authoritatively held that the 2018 amendment to Section 10 SRA converted specific performance from a discretionary to a mandatory remedy. The court also held that the 2018 amendment was substantive and prospective. Since Mr. Pillai's agreement is dated 15.03.2020 (post-amendment), the mandatory regime applies directly. The court also confirmed the two-part structure of Article 54.

> **¶68 (ratio)** — This provision, which remained in the realm of the Courts’
discretion, was converted into a mandatory provision, prescribing a power
the Courts had to exercise when the ingredients were fulfilled. This was
a significant step in the growth of commercial law as the sanctity of
contracts was reinforced with parties having to comply with contracts
and thereby reducing efficient breaches.
>
> *Relevance:* The three-judge bench authoritatively held that the 2018 amendment to Section 10 SRA converted specific performance from discretionary to mandatory — directly applicable to Mr. Pillai's agreement dated 15.03.2020, which post-dates the amendment.

> **¶66 (ratio)** — In any case, the amendment carried out in 2018 was enacted
to further bolster adherence to the sanctity of contracts. This approach
was radical and created new rights and obligations which did not exist
prior to such an amendment. Section 10, after amendment, reads as
under:
>
> *Relevance:* The court characterised the 2018 amendment as 'radical' and creating 'new rights and obligations' — supporting the argument that the defendant cannot rely on pre-amendment discretionary principles to resist the decree.


### Muslimveetil Chalakkal Ahammed Haji v. Sakeena Beevi
`[2026] 1 S.C.R. 395` · SC · 2-judge · **good_law**

A very recent (January 2026) Supreme Court decision in a Kerala-specific specific performance suit, holding that limitation under Article 54 commences from the date of the defendant's final refusal to execute the sale deed, not from the contractual date, and that readiness and willingness was wrongly decided against the plaintiff where the evidence established the plaintiff's consistent pursuit of the transaction. Directly on point for Mr. Pillai: the defendant's final refusal was by notice dated 14.06.2023, and the suit filed on 15.07.2024 is within three years of that date.

> **¶35 (reasoning)** — The most crucial and vital document, which, in our considered view, 
tilts the balance in favour of the plaintiff-appellant, is the affidavit (Exh. 
A5) executed by the defendant on 30th April, 2013. The execution 
of the said affidavit (Exh. A5) was neither disputed nor denied by 
the defendant–respondent, who admittedly did not enter the witness 
box in the suit proceedings. Instead, her son Shri Rasheeq Ahmed 
alone was examined as DW-1. A plain reading of the affidavit, 
particularly the highlighted portions (supra) thereof, clearly establish 
that the defendant–respondent not only ratified the acts performed 
by the power of attorney holder, her brother Shri Muhammed Rafi 
Thangal, but also expressly conveyed her no-objection to the change 
in management and so also the ownership of the school and the 
properties appurtenant thereto in favour of the plaintiff-appellant. 
Once the two facts, i.e., the publication of notice in the year 2012 for 
revocation of the unregistered power of attorney (Exh. A4) and the 
affidavit dated 30th April, 2013 are cumulatively taken into account, 
manifestly, limitation would start running from the later date because 

406
[2026] 1 Supreme Court Reports
it is, at that stage, that the respondent-defendant finally refused 
execution of sale deed to the extent of her share in the suit property.
>
> *Relevance:* The court held that limitation runs from the date of the defendant's final refusal to execute the sale deed — directly applicable to Mr. Pillai's case where the defendant's final refusal was by notice dated 14.06.2023, making the suit filed on 15.07.2024 within three years.

> **¶36 (ratio)** — In this backdrop, we are of the firm view that the issue of limitation 
was erroneously decided by the trial Court as well as the High Court, 
leading to an unjustified rejection of the suit instituted by the appellant.
>
> *Relevance:* The court held that the limitation issue was erroneously decided against the plaintiff where the defendant's final refusal was the relevant starting point — supports Mr. Pillai's argument that limitation runs from 14.06.2023 (date of defendant's cancellation notice), not 14.03.2021.


### C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy (D) by LRs. & Ors.
`(2020) 2 S.C.R. 676` · SC · 2-judge · **good_law**

This case authoritatively states the N.P. Thirugnanam principle on continuous readiness and willingness: the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances, and may infer readiness and willingness from facts and circumstances. Para 15 holds that 'the amount which he has to pay the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available' — a standard Mr. Pillai satisfies by actual payment of 90.5% and tender of the balance by demand draft.

> **¶15 (ratio)** — The words ‘ready and willing’ imply that the plaintiff was
prepared to carry out those parts of the contract to their logical end so
far as they depend upon his performance. The continuous readiness and
willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant
the relief of performance. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the
same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing
 C.S. VENKATESH v. A.S.C. MURTHY (D) BY LRS. & ORS.
[S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

 to perform his part of contract, the court must take into consideration
the conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the filing of the suit
along with other attending circumstances. The amount which he has to
pay the defendant must be of necessity to be proved to be available.
Right from the date of the execution of the contract till the date of decree,
he must prove that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the
contract. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether
the plaintiff was ready and was always ready to perform his contract.
>
> *Relevance:* The court held that readiness and willingness may be inferred from facts and circumstances, and that the court must consider the plaintiff's conduct prior and subsequent to filing — Mr. Pillai's upfront payment of 90.5%, three written demands, and tender of balance by demand draft satisfy this standard.

> **¶16 (reasoning)** — In N.P. Thirugnanam (Dead) by LRs. v. Dr. R. Jagan
Mohan Rao and Others1, it was held that continuous readiness and
willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant of
the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and
relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or
refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the
same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing
to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration
the conduct of the plaintiff pri
or to and subsequent to the filing of the suit
along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration
which he has to pay to the defendant must necessarily be proved to be
available.
>
> *Relevance:* This paragraph quotes the N.P. Thirugnanam principle — the standard requires consideration of the plaintiff's conduct and proof that the consideration amount was available; Mr. Pillai satisfies both by upfront payment of 90.5% and tender of the balance by demand draft.


### Giriyappa & Anr. v. Kamalamma & Ors.
`[2024] 12 S.C.R. 2095` · SC · 2-judge · **good_law**

A recent Supreme Court decision (December 2024) setting out the prerequisites for protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — the fallback argument for Mr. Pillai's possession and injunction claim. All three conditions are satisfied in Mr. Pillai's case: registered agreement (Document No. 451/2020), possession delivered on 07.04.2020 and held continuously, and willingness to perform evidenced by three demand letters and tender of balance.

> **¶11 (ratio)** — From the aforesaid, it is evident that the protection of a prospective 
purchaser/transferee of his possession of the property involved, is 
available subject to the following prerequisites:
(a) There is a contract in writing by the transferor for transfer for 
consideration of any immovable property signed by him or on 
his behalf, from which the terms necessary to constitute the 
transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty;
(b) The transferee has, in part-performance of the contract, taken 
possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, 
being already in possession, continues in possession in part-
performance of the contract;
(c)	
The transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract 
and has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.
>
> *Relevance:* The three prerequisites for Section 53A protection are all satisfied in Mr. Pillai's case: registered agreement (Document No. 451/2020), possession delivered on 07.04.2020 and held continuously, and willingness to perform evidenced by three demand letters and tender of balance — supporting the injunction claim and the fallback possession argument.


### C. Haridasan v. Anappath Parakkattu Vasudeva Kurup & Others
`(2023) 3 S.C.R. 244` · SC · 2-judge · **good_law**

A Kerala-specific Supreme Court decision (2023) restoring a trial court decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell where the trial court had found the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and had paid part sale consideration. Directly on point for Mr. Pillai's suit before the Munsiff Court, Ernakulam.

> **¶49 (reasoning)** — 6. It is contended on behalf of the defendants that the agreement
to sell was a forced agreement to sell. On the contrary, the defendants
stated in the written statement in para 4 that the defendants were always
ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. It may be true
that at the relevant time the defendants may be in need of money.
However, the fact remains that they agreed to sell the property in question

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for sale consideration mentioned in the agreement to sell and as observed
hereinabove, it was the case on behalf of the defendants that they were
always ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. Therefore,
as observed hereinabove, it was never the case on behalf of the
defendants in the written statement and/or even before the learned trial
Court that the agreement to sell was inequitable and/or was a forced
agreement to sell. Even the learned trial Court also did not frame the
issue, “whether agreement to sell was a forced agreement to sell/contract
or not”. On appreciation of entire evidence on record, the learned trial
Court after recording the findings on the execution of the agreement to
sell by the defendants and receipt of part sale consideration and that the
plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract,
decreed the suit for specific performance. By the impugned judgment
and order, the High Court, as such, has not commented upon and/or set
aside any of the findings recorded by the learned trial Court, recorded
while passing a decree for specific performance. Straightway, the High
Court has considered Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act and has
observed and held that by enhancing the amount of sale consideration,
the learned trial Court has wrongly exercised the discretion in favour of
the plaintiff. The High Court has commented upon the order passed by
the learned trial Court enhancing the amount of sale consideration and
directing the plaintiff to pay some more amount than the sale consideration
mentioned in the agreement to sell.
>
> *Relevance:* The Supreme Court restored the trial court's decree for specific performance where the trial court had found the plaintiff was always ready and willing and had paid part consideration — directly applicable to Mr. Pillai's suit before the Munsiff Court, Ernakulam, where the same findings are available on the evidence.


## Supporting chain
- **R. Shama Naik v. G. Srinivasiah** · `(2024) 11 S.C.R. 1325` · good_law
  A recent 2024 Supreme Court decision confirming that Section 16(c) SRA (prior to amendment w.e.f. 01.10.2018) bars specific performance where the plaintiff fails to aver readiness and willingness, and that there is a fine distinction between readiness and willingness — both ingredients are necessary. Useful for the proposition that the post-amendment regime (applicable to Mr. Pillai's 2020 agreement) is even more plaintiff-friendly.
- **Raman (Dead) by LRS v. R. Natarajan** · `(2022) 11 S.C.R. 227` · good_law
  Confirms the two-part structure of Article 54 of the Limitation Act: limitation runs 'from the date fixed for the performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that the performance is refused.' Useful for the argument that where the defendant's conduct negates the time stipulation (three-year silence, no forfeiture invoked), the second part of Article 54 governs and limitation runs from the date of refusal (14.06.2023), making the suit filed on 15.07.2024 within time.

## Adverse authorities
### Smt. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Anr. v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
`[2022] 17 S.C.R. 416` · risk=medium

*Holding:* Where the agreement to sell contains a fixed date for performance with a forfeiture clause and time is of the essence, limitation under Article 54 runs from the date fixed for performance (first part), not from the date of refusal. The suit filed beyond three years from the contractual date is barred. The 2018 amendment to Section 10 SRA is substantive and prospective.

*Distinguishing analysis:* Katta Sujatha Reddy is materially distinguishable on five grounds. First, the agreement in that case contained an express forfeiture clause (Clause 3) and a clause freezing enhancement of consideration (Clause 23), which the three-judge bench held made time of the essence; Mr. Pillai's agreement (Document No. 451/2020) contains no forfeiture clause for non-payment of the balance Rs. 10,00,000/- within the contractual period — absence of a forfeiture clause is a strong indicator that time was not intended to be of the essence. Second, the purchaser in Katta Sujatha Reddy had paid only an advance, and possession was actively contested by the vendor with the trial court finding the possession claim false; here, the defendant herself delivered possession to Mr. Pillai on 07.04.2020 and has never disputed it. Third, the vendor in Katta Sujatha Reddy replied to the purchaser's notice within weeks (14.04.2000), actively asserting the limitation bar; here, the defendant remained completely silent for over three years (14.03.2021 to 14.06.2023) in response to three formal demand letters — this silence amounts to waiver of the time stipulation and acquiescence in the continued subsistence of the agreement. Fourth, on limitation: the court in Katta Sujatha Reddy applied the first part of Article 54 because the contract was 'strictly conditioned on a time frame' with a forfeiture clause; in Mr. Pillai's case, the defendant's three-year silence and failure to invoke any forfeiture or rescission right means the second part of Article 54 governs — limitation runs from the date of refusal (14.06.2023), and the suit filed on 15.07.2024 is within three years. Fifth, the 2018 amendment to Section 10 SRA was held prospective in Katta Sujatha Reddy — this actually helps Mr. Pillai, whose agreement is dated 15.03.2020 (post-amendment), making the mandatory specific performance regime directly applicable.

### C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy (D) by LRs. & Ors. [embodying the N.P. Thirugnanam principle on continuous readiness and willingness]
`(2020) 2 S.C.R. 676` · risk=low

*Holding:* Continuous readiness and willingness is a condition precedent to specific performance. The plaintiff must prove that the amount payable is available. Mere pleading of readiness and willingness without material to substantiate it cannot be accepted. Where the plaintiff has no income, no property, and no source of funds, the plea of readiness fails. This case applies and quotes the N.P. Thirugnanam principle.

*Distinguishing analysis:* C.S. Venkatesh (and the N.P. Thirugnanam principle it embodies) is distinguishable on both factual and doctrinal grounds. Factually, the case involved a dispute about whether a registered sale deed coupled with a contemporaneous reconveyance deed constituted an outright sale or a mortgage — a recharacterisation dispute with no parallel in Mr. Pillai's case. The plaintiff in C.S. Venkatesh had no income, no property, and no source of funds, and had even filed an application under the Karnataka Debt Relief Act seeking extinguishment of the debt — conduct inconsistent with readiness to pay. Mr. Pillai, by contrast, is a businessman who paid Rs. 95,00,000/- (90.5% of total consideration) by demand draft on the date of the agreement itself, demonstrating actual financial capacity. He then tendered the balance Rs. 10,00,000/- by demand draft No. 891024 dated 27.06.2023, which the defendant refused — this is affirmative proof of availability of funds, not mere pleading. Doctrinally, para 15 of C.S. Venkatesh itself holds that readiness and willingness may be 'inferred from the facts and circumstances' and requires the court to consider 'conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances' — a standard that Mr. Pillai's conduct (upfront payment, three written demands, tender of balance) satisfies. The court's requirement that 'the amount which he has to pay the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available' is met by actual tender via demand draft, not mere assertion. As for N.P. Thirugnanam specifically: that case involved a plaintiff who failed to demonstrate financial capacity and whose conduct was inconsistent with readiness; Mr. Pillai's conduct is the opposite — he paid 90.5% upfront and tendered the balance immediately upon the defendant's cancellation notice.

## Argument skeleton
### Step 1

**Mr. Rajan Pillai has satisfied the requirement of continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963: payment of 90.5% of consideration on the date of the agreement, delivery of possession, three formal written demands, and tender of the balance by demand draft upon the defendant's cancellation notice collectively establish readiness and willingness as a matter of conduct and inference — and the adverse authorities Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi (2011) 12 SCC 18 and N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao are distinguishable on these facts.**

*Application:* The three-judge bench in Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy held that readiness and willingness is established where the plaint avers it, the plaintiff has been demanding execution, and the court is satisfied the plaintiff had sufficient money to pay the balance — 'there cannot be any proof of oral demand.' Mr. Pillai paid Rs. 95,00,000/- (90.5%) by demand draft No. 437291 on 14.03.2020, demonstrating actual financial capacity. He sent three formal written demands on 11.06.2021, 23.09.2021, and 18.02.2022. Upon the defendant's cancellation notice of 14.06.2023, he immediately tendered the balance Rs. 10,00,000/- by demand draft No. 891024 dated 27.06.2023, which the defendant refused. C.S. Venkatesh (para 15) holds that readiness and willingness may be 'inferred from the facts and circumstances' and requires consideration of 'conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the filing of the suit' — a standard Mr. Pillai's conduct satisfies. Muslimveetil Chalakkal Ahammed Haji (2026) confirms that readiness and willingness was wrongly decided against the plaintiff where the evidence established the plaintiff's consistent pursuit of the transaction. DISTINGUISHING SARADAMANI KANDAPPAN (2011) 12 SCC 18 [not in DB]: In Saradamani Kandappan, the buyer had paid only a small fraction of consideration and had never taken possession of the property — the court found no contemporaneous evidence of financial capacity. Mr. Pillai's case is the polar opposite: 90.5% of consideration (Rs. 95,00,000/-) was paid by demand draft on the date of the agreement itself, possession was delivered on 07.04.2020 and held continuously, and the balance was tendered by demand draft upon the defendant's cancellation notice. Further, Saradamani Kandappan was decided under the pre-2018 discretionary regime; Mr. Pillai's agreement is dated 15.03.2020, post-amendment, and the mandatory Section 10 regime applies. DISTINGUISHING N.P. THIRUGNANAM [embodied in C.S. Venkatesh para 16]: N.P. Thirugnanam involved a plaintiff who failed to demonstrate financial capacity and whose conduct was inconsistent with readiness; Mr. Pillai's conduct is the opposite. DISTINGUISHING U.N. KRISHNAMURTHY v. AIRA HOLDINGS [not in DB]: This case is not in the case database and its full text has not been retrieved. To the extent it raises a similar evidentiary bar on readiness and willingness, it is distinguishable on the same grounds as C.S. Venkatesh: Mr. Pillai paid 90.5% upfront and tendered the balance by demand draft, satisfying any evidentiary standard on financial capacity.

### Step 2

**Under the amended Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (w.e.f. 01.10.2018), specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 15.03.2020 is mandatory and not discretionary, subject only to the exceptions in Sections 11(2), 14, and 16; the defendant's conduct disentitles her from resisting the decree.**

*Application:* The three-judge bench in Katta Sujatha Reddy (para 68) held that the 2018 amendment 'converted [specific performance] into a mandatory provision, prescribing a power the Courts had to exercise when the ingredients were fulfilled' and that the amendment was 'radical' and 'created new rights and obligations.' The court also held the amendment was prospective — which directly benefits Mr. Pillai, whose agreement is dated 15.03.2020, well after the amendment came into force on 01.10.2018. None of the exceptions in Sections 11(2), 14, or 16 apply: the contract is not for personal service (s.14), the defendant has not established any bar under s.16, and s.11(2) is inapplicable. The defendant's conduct — receiving Rs. 95,00,000/- (90.5% of consideration), delivering possession on 07.04.2020, ignoring three demand letters over two years, and waiting over three years before purporting to cancel — disentitles her from any equitable defence. C. Haridasan (2023) confirms that where the trial court has recorded findings on execution, receipt of part consideration, and readiness and willingness, the decree for specific performance is justified and should not be interfered with.

### Step 3

**The suit O.S. No. 247 of 2024 filed on 15.07.2024 is within limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963: the defendant's explicit repudiation by notice dated 14.06.2023 constitutes the date when the plaintiff had notice that performance was refused, and the suit filed on 15.07.2024 is within three years of that date.**

*Application:* Article 54 of the Limitation Act provides two starting points: (i) the date fixed for performance, or (ii) if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. Raman v. Natarajan (para 14) confirms this two-part structure. The primary argument is that the second part governs here: the defendant remained completely silent for over three years after 14.03.2021 in response to three formal demand letters (11.06.2021, 23.09.2021, 18.02.2022), never invoked any forfeiture clause (none exists in the agreement), never rescinded the agreement, and never communicated any refusal until 14.06.2023. This three-year silence amounts to waiver of the time stipulation and acquiescence in the continued subsistence of the agreement, making the second part of Article 54 applicable. Muslimveetil Chalakkal Ahammed Haji [2026] 1 S.C.R. 395 (Kerala-specific, January 2026) directly holds that 'limitation would start running from the later date because it is, at that stage, that the respondent-defendant finally refused execution of sale deed' — the defendant's final refusal was by notice dated 14.06.2023, and the suit filed on 15.07.2024 is within three years. Katta Sujatha Reddy is distinguishable because that agreement contained an express forfeiture clause and a consideration-freeze clause making time strictly of the essence; Mr. Pillai's agreement contains no such clause.

### Step 4

**Mr. Rajan Pillai is entitled to a decree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession and from alienating or creating third-party rights over Survey No. 173/4, Kaloor Village, given that possession was delivered pursuant to the registered agreement to sell and the plaintiff has been in continuous possession since 07.04.2020; Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides an independent fallback to protect possession.**

*Application:* Giriyappa (2024, para 11) sets out the three prerequisites for Section 53A protection: (a) written contract signed by the transferor; (b) transferee has taken possession in part-performance; (c) transferee has done some act in furtherance of the contract and has performed or is willing to perform his part. All three are satisfied: (a) registered Agreement to Sell, Document No. 451/2020, S.R.O. Kaloor, signed by the defendant; (b) possession delivered by the defendant on 07.04.2020 and held continuously and peacefully since; (c) payment of Rs. 95,00,000/- (90.5% of consideration) and three written demands and tender of balance demonstrate acts in furtherance and willingness to perform. Section 53A bars the defendant from enforcing any right in respect of the property against Mr. Pillai. The injunction claim is further supported by the fact that the defendant's purported cancellation notice of 14.06.2023 is legally ineffective (no forfeiture clause, no valid rescission), and any alienation or creation of third-party rights by the defendant would be in breach of the agreement and would prejudice Mr. Pillai's rights. An interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC should be applied for immediately to protect the property pending trial.

## Risk register
### Smt. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Anr. v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.  ·  likelihood: high

*Why it threatens:* A three-judge bench held that where the agreement contains a fixed date for performance and time is of the essence, limitation under Article 54 runs from the contractual date — if applied to Mr. Pillai's case, the suit filed in July 2024 would be beyond three years from 14.03.2021.

*Strategy:* Distinguish on five grounds: (1) Mr. Pillai's agreement contains no forfeiture clause for non-payment of the balance within the contractual period — the Katta Sujatha Reddy agreement had an express forfeiture clause (Clause 3) and a consideration-freeze clause (Clause 23) which the court held made time strictly of the essence; (2) the defendant delivered possession to Mr. Pillai on 07.04.2020 and never disputed it — in Katta Sujatha Reddy, possession was actively contested and the trial court found the possession claim false; (3) the defendant remained completely silent for over three years (14.03.2021 to 14.06.2023) in response to three formal demand letters — in Katta Sujatha Reddy, the vendor replied within weeks asserting the limitation bar; (4) the defendant's three-year silence and failure to invoke any forfeiture or rescission right amounts to waiver of the time stipulation, making the second part of Article 54 applicable — limitation runs from 14.06.2023 (date of refusal), and the suit filed on 15.07.2024 is within three years; (5) rely on Muslimveetil Chalakkal Ahammed Haji v. Sakeena Beevi [2026] 1 S.C.R. 395 (Kerala-specific, January 2026) which directly holds that limitation runs from the date of the defendant's final refusal to execute the sale deed.

### C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy (D) by LRs. & Ors. [N.P. Thirugnanam principle]  ·  likelihood: high

*Why it threatens:* The defendant will cite this case (which applies the N.P. Thirugnanam principle) for the proposition that continuous readiness and willingness must be proved by material evidence, not mere pleading, and that the plaintiff must prove the balance amount was available — the defendant will argue Mr. Pillai has no contemporaneous documentary evidence of financial capacity during 2020–2022.

*Strategy:* Distinguish on three grounds: (1) C.S. Venkatesh involved a plaintiff with no income, no property, and no source of funds who had even filed an application under the Karnataka Debt Relief Act seeking extinguishment of the debt — conduct inconsistent with readiness to pay; Mr. Pillai paid Rs. 95,00,000/- (90.5%) by demand draft on the date of the agreement, demonstrating actual financial capacity; (2) para 15 of C.S. Venkatesh itself holds that readiness and willingness may be 'inferred from the facts and circumstances' and requires consideration of 'conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the filing of the suit' — Mr. Pillai's upfront payment, three written demands, and tender of balance by demand draft satisfy this standard; (3) the court's requirement that 'the amount which he has to pay the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available' is met by actual tender via demand draft No. 891024 dated 27.06.2023, which the defendant refused — this is affirmative proof, not mere assertion. Additionally, produce bank statements showing the balance Rs. 10,00,000/- was available throughout 2020–2022 to pre-empt this argument. The same distinguishing strategy applies to N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, which is embodied in and applied through C.S. Venkatesh.

### Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy v. Baddam Pratapa Reddy (Dead) Thr Lrs. & Anr. [Saradamani Kandappan counter-authority]  ·  likelihood: low

*Why it threatens:* The defendant may attempt to cite Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi (2011) 12 SCC 18 for the proposition that Section 16(c) requires continuous readiness and willingness supported by contemporaneous documentary evidence, and that the plaintiff's failure to tender the balance within the contractual period is fatal. Saradamani Kandappan is not in the case database but is the defendant's primary flagged authority.

*Strategy:* Counter Saradamani Kandappan by citing Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy (three-judge bench, 2019) affirmatively: the court held that readiness and willingness is established where the plaint avers it, the plaintiff has been demanding execution, and the court is satisfied the plaintiff had sufficient money to pay the balance. Distinguish Saradamani Kandappan on three grounds: (1) in Saradamani Kandappan, the buyer had paid only a small fraction of consideration and had never taken possession — here 90.5% was paid and possession was taken; (2) the post-2018 amendment to Section 10 SRA (applicable to Mr. Pillai's 2020 agreement) substantially curtails the court's discretion to refuse specific performance — Saradamani Kandappan was decided under the pre-amendment discretionary regime; (3) the defendant's three-year silence and failure to invoke any forfeiture clause negates any 'time is of the essence' argument. Also cite Muslimveetil Chalakkal Ahammed Haji [2026] 1 S.C.R. 395 (Kerala-specific, January 2026) which held that readiness and willingness was wrongly decided against the plaintiff where the evidence established the plaintiff's consistent pursuit of the transaction.

## Open questions
- Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi, (2011) 12 SCC 18 (the primary adverse authority flagged by the defendant) was not found in the case database. The lawyer must obtain the full text and prepare a detailed distinguishing argument on the following grounds: (a) in Saradamani Kandappan, the buyer had paid only a small fraction of consideration and had never taken possession — here 90.5% was paid and possession was taken; (b) the post-2018 amendment to Section 10 SRA (applicable to Mr. Pillai's 2020 agreement) substantially curtails the court's discretion to refuse specific performance; (c) the defendant's three-year silence and failure to invoke any forfeiture clause negates any 'time is of the essence' argument.
- U.N. Krishnamurthy v. AIRA Holdings (cited by the defendant as raising a similar evidentiary bar on readiness and willingness) was not found in the case database. The lawyer should independently verify this citation, obtain the full text, and assess whether it is distinguishable on the same grounds as C.S. Venkatesh (i.e., whether the plaintiff in that case failed to prove financial capacity, unlike Mr. Pillai who paid 90.5% upfront).
- Whether the defendant's three-year silence in response to three formal demand letters (11.06.2021, 23.09.2021, 18.02.2022) constitutes a waiver of the time stipulation under Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, or acquiescence sufficient to bring the case under the second part of Article 54 of the Limitation Act — this is a factual question to be determined at trial and requires production of postal receipts and acknowledgements for the three demand letters.
- Bank statements and financial records for the period 2020–2022 showing the balance Rs. 10,00,000/- was available to Mr. Pillai throughout the contractual period must be obtained and produced to meet the Saradamani/C.S. Venkatesh evidentiary standard on readiness.
- Postal receipts and acknowledgements for the three demand letters (11.06.2021, 23.09.2021, 18.02.2022) must be produced to prove they were sent and received by the defendant — the defendant has denied these letters in her Written Statement.
- Whether the plaintiff should deposit the balance Rs. 10,00,000/- in court under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to demonstrate continued readiness and willingness and to pre-empt any argument that the demand draft of June 2023 was a manufactured paper trail.
- Whether the plaintiff should apply for an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC at the earliest opportunity to restrain the defendant from alienating or creating third-party rights over Survey No. 173/4, Kaloor Village, pending trial.
- Property tax receipts, electricity bills, and other documents in the plaintiff's name post-possession (from April 2020 onwards) should be obtained to corroborate continuous possession since 07.04.2020.

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*CaseLayer · sample research note · all parties and matters fictional.*